Greetings once more

I still live and work on the Cape Flats and am reminded of the violence our people are exposed to on a daily basis. Not only are the incessant sounds of gunshots and police/ambulance sirens a constant notice of the painful times we live in but also the hurtful comments of people I encounter on a daily basis who place the blame for the status quo squarely on the shoulders of government. The battle against crime is not being won!

We cannot continue like this and I imagine that this is the feeling of yourselves and the rest of the cabinet as well. My time spent working for the Constitutional Committee of the ANC has broadened my perspective on life immensely. It was as a result of the skills gained then that I have started out my business and it is because of my vast exposure over the ensuing years that I have been able to build up the following proposal that I am presenting to you.

The concept is simple. Digitise, that’s right, Digitise. We have access to all the resources. We have begun collating all of the data. All we now need to do is harness all of the information into a digital format, make use of existing technology, and make the results available in an idiot-proof manner to the law enforcement agencies.

1. The needs are simple.

  1. A modest (in government terms) capital injection
  2. Extensive training of specialised squads (Rapid Reaction Units)
  3. Untainted/honest civil servants to staff these units
  4. Acquisition of readily available equipment
  5. Widespread use of roadblocks for most crimes
  6. Inclusion and support of big business and
  7. The will to succeed

 

 

2. Successful implementation of the project will result in:

  1. Improved apprehension and conviction rates
  2. Enhanced intelligence capabilities
  3. Drastic reductions in the crime rate
  4. Fast-tracking the regulation of the minibus taxi industry
  5. Increased respect for government by the population.
  6. Reduced pressure on an already over-burdened criminal justice system
  7. Greater investor confidence which has it's own positive spin-offs

Roadblocks are highly visible. Extensive use of it as a serious policing tool is in itself a deterrent to criminals. And from my experience road commuters would welcome the inconvenience if they knew that it is being used as a regular crime-fighting tool and not only one of those routine quarterly check-ups.

3. Failure to act can and will lead to:

  1. Increased arrogance amongst the perpetrators
  2. Ballooning crime figures
  3. Decreased public morale
  4. Rapidly reducing public confidence in government
  5. Increasing negative effects on the economy and
  6. Fading hopes of an African Renaissance

Crime-Prevention Project

4. The Tools:

Information means nothing if it is not readily available and in a format that is useful to the end-user.

Our most important tool in this regard is a digital camera. There are cameras currently available with flash memory cards that can hold upwards of 500 photographs that can be transferred to computer in an instant. These cards can then be re-used over and over gain. Over and above the fact that photographs are instantly available, they also have the facility to date and time stamp any pictures taken.

The next piece of equipment would be a high-powered laptop computer which will provide the link to a central computer or provide the necessary data from it's own hard drive.

The final part of the jigsaw is a Wireless Applications Protocol, WAP enabled mobile telephone. This would provide the user with access to information stored elsewhere with the least amount of fuss and bother.

All of the other bits of information we already have - finger print readers, a huge national database of fingerprints, ID numbers etc.

 

5. Corporate Partnerships

6. The Róle-players

7. Special Actions

7.1 Strategic Locations

I might be at risk of reinventing the wheel here, but we need to look at each major city, town, district and township and identify the most effective locations for setting up roadblocks (dependent upon where the crime was committed). The former regime has made that painfully easy when it comes to the townships with their "town planning" focusing more on control than on functionality. In the "bad old days" cities each had a civil defense strategy which pre-empted any serious disaster befalling a city. In much the same way the most effective locations should be identified before the crime is committed. In this way we have a national blue print known only to a handful of trusted senior people. The locations of these control points will vary from crime to crime and therefore it would be impossible for anyone to tip-off the criminals beforehand. Major access roads should be identified as should important arterial and other roads. The roadblock strategy should then operate in 4 phases.

It is imperative that eye-witness accounts are gathered immediately in order to pass significant information on to the people staffing the roadblocks or scanning the area. With the above system "containment" becomes critical to success; unlike the current scenario where police end up chasing the perpetrators and the search becomes open-ended.

7.2 Firearm Registration

Much fuss and bother has been made about the Firearms Control Act, to the point of Constand Viljoen even threatening to emigrate if forced to part with his dearly beloved weapons. As in all things that affect us as South Africans, the solutions lie in the simplest of applications.

In this way,

8. Implementation:

Assuming that all of the above róle-players come to the party and all of the data can be made available, we would have completed step one in our move towards reducing the crime rate.

The rest of the plan is easy. Roadblocks must become the order of the day in combating most forms of crime from kidnapping through bank robberies to bombings.

This then is the plan that I believe will work. As an aside, in terms of the recent blockade of Khyalitsha. Time will tell if the strategy worked. I personally would have implemented the blockade without closing the ranks. The only difference would be that taxis would not be let out beyond the blockade and buses would not be let in. I would let the blockade run for at least a week. The taxis would make a limited income ferrying passengers to the outskirts of Khyalitsha where the buses would take over. The benefits from this are multiple.

I would also have extended the blockade to the other areas affected by the violence. The whole exercise could have been used to force all taxis to re-register themselves in a way acceptable to the authorities. This would facilitate the regulation of the industry in the province.

 

9. Conclusion

The above plan is implementable. I am certain that there are many logistical and other constraints that I have either overlooked or am unaware of, but for me the overiding factor is the fact that police will be visible in their actions. This will not go unnoticed by the general public and the chances of success are far greater than has been achieved thus far.

It is commendable that progress has been made with regard to the taxi violence here in the Western Cape. What bothers me is that the breakthrough coincided with the installation of Hennie Bester as the MEC for Safety and Security in the province.

Enough said.

I trust that this proposal is received in a positive light. We need to address the problem not only here in the Western Cape but on a national level. Also importantly we cannot afford to be upstaged subversively by others who will claim all the credit for solving the crime problem.

If I might suggest a workshop to discuss this strategy and others which are currently in place, I would be only too willing to co-ordinate such an event. This will include inviting the relevant róle players and potential corporate partners, assisting with drawing up the agenda and all other related logistical functions.

I look forward to your input.

Best regards

 

Clive Newman